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We argue that a higher degree of de facto independence of the legal system from the other government 
branches as well as public trust in the legal system may reduce the average inflation record of countries 
through a direct and an indirect channel. The direct channel works by affecting potential output, while 
the indirect channel helps to increase the de facto independence of the central bank. In the empirical 
section of the paper, we present evidence in favour of both channels in a sample containing both 
developed and less developed countries. A model that contains a legal system indicator in addition to de 
jure central bank independence, checks and balances within government, and openness can explain a 
large share of the variation in the logarithm of the inflation rate. 
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1 Introduction 
The determinants of long-run average inflation have received broad attention over the last 
decade: formal central bank independence was shown to be a good predictor for low inflation in 
OECD countries, whereas the turnover rate of central bank governors has been identified as an 
important determinant of inflation rates in Less Developed Countries (some of the original 
contributions are Cukierman 1992, Cukierman et al. 1992, Debelle and Fisher 1995, Grilli et al. 
1991, and Posen 1993. Berger et al. 2001 and Hayo and Hefeker 2002 are surveys). 
The creation of a (formally) independent central bank by a government is usually interpreted as 
an attempt to reduce its problem of credibly committing to a policy of stable money. It has been 
shown (Kydland and Prescott 1977) that governments with authority over money supply may be 
subject to time-inconsistent preferences: the promise of expanding monetary supply according to 
some fixed rule is not credible because once long-term contracts have been agreed upon by 
private actors, the government has an incentive to expand money supply by more than promised. 
The delegation of monetary authority to independent central banks with conservative governors 
(Rogoff 1985) is often considered to be one way of escaping the commitment problem. 
Yet, the empirical finding that a close correlation between formally independent central banks 
and inflation rates only exists in OECD countries points to a possible shortcoming of this 
simplistic view: if government has the capacity to create a formally independent central bank, it 
might also be strong enough to overrule its decisions, simply ignore them, or abolish the 
independent central bank again. This has been coined second-order commitment problem 
(Moser 1999). One question immediately arises: what are the conditions that enable central 
banks to act independently of government interventions in some countries but not in others? One 
answer has been proposed by Keefer and Stasavage (2003) who argue that the number of veto 
players is crucial: the more veto players there are, the more likely is legal central bank 
independence (CBI) to correspond with factual CBI. In their paper, Keefer and Stasavage did   3
not explicitly emphasise the potential role of the judiciary. In this paper, we argue that the 
factual independence of the judiciary is a potentially important variable for determining inflation 
through (i) a direct transmission channel (affecting natural unemployment and/or potential 
output) and (ii) an indirect transmission channel (affecting de facto CBI). We measure the 
impact of the legal system by an indicator for de facto JI suggested by Feld and Voigt (2003), by 
an indicator for legal trust, which has been derived from the World Values Survey (World 
Values Survey Study Group 2000), and by a factor derived from these two variables. 
We find that a highly independent or trustworthy legal system is systematically correlated with 
the turnover rate of central bank governors, which can be interpreted as a crude proxy for (the 
inverse of) de facto CBI. Thus, the judiciary affects inflation indirectly via de facto CBI. In 
addition, we show that the independence of the legal system helps to directly explain low 
inflation rates. If the derived factor based on de facto JI and legal trust is added to the equation 
conventionally used for explaining long-run average inflation, the coefficient of determination 
increases from 0.48 to 0.68 in our sample. Based on these results we argue that in order for 
monetary policy to be successful, it is not sufficient to set up a (formally) independent central 
bank but that other policy areas – such as the judicial one – explicitly need to be taken into 
account. 
The paper is organized as follows: the next section contains a description of the rationale for the 
two major hypotheses, namely (i) that the degree of factual CBI might be influenced by factual 
judicial independence and that (ii) the inflation rate might be influenced by the factual 
independence of the judiciary independently from the degree of formal CBI. Section three 
introduces the econometric model, section four contains a discussion of the estimated results for 
the indirect channel of transmission, and section five discusses the results for the direct channel. 
The last section summarises the argument and contains some policy conclusions.   4
2 On the Relevance of the Judiciary for Inflation 
Independence of both judiciary and central bank means that its representatives can expect their 
decisions to be implemented even if they are not in line with the (short-term) interests of 
government members. Independence also means that judges or board members of central banks 
do not have to anticipate other negative consequences as a result of their decisions such as (i) 
being expelled, (ii) being paid less, or (iii) being made less influential. We further propose to 
distinguish between de jure and de facto independence with regard to both CBI and judicial 
independence (JI). De jure CBI would be equivalent to CBI as measured on the basis of legal 
documents whereas de facto CBI would be equivalent to CBI as factually implemented. 
Cukierman (1992, 370) clarified that CBI does not mean that the board members can do 
whatever they want but rather their ability to stick to the objective of price stability without 
outside interference. Tighter constraints on the central bankers (e.g. on borrowing to the 
government) can thus translate into higher degrees of independence. 
The second order commitment problem shortly described in the introduction implies that simply 
delegating competence to some formally independent agency such as a central bank might not 
be sufficient to turn promises into credible commitments. The capacity to credibly commit 
might depend on other institutional features such as a factually independent judiciary. If the 
judiciary is factually independent, the government is able to make credible commitments. The 
promise – made in t0 – to pay bondholders x% interest on their bonds in t1 is credible if a third 
party, i.e. neither the government nor the bondholders, has the power to ascertain who has 
breached the contract and if its decisions are binding even if they are not in the interest of one of 
the parties, e.g. the government. This is exactly the definition of judicial independence chosen 
above. If the judiciary is factually independent in this sense, the government is restricted in its 
actions. But the flipside is that this enables the government to make credible commitments. In 
the example, interest rates can be expected to be lower.   5
Due to the second order commitment problem, the delegation of competence to a formally 
independent central bank or judiciary is not sufficient to allow the government to make credible 
commitments. It is not de jure independence that counts but rather de facto independence. This 
theoretical point has recently been confirmed by empirical evidence. On the basis of 73 
countries, Feld and Voigt (2003, 2004) show that de jure JI is largely irrelevant for economic 
growth, whereas de facto JI does seem to be conducive to economic growth in a significant and 
robust manner. With regard to CBI, we expect similar results. In fact, the observation that de 
jure CBI is a good predictor for inflation rates only in OECD countries, whereas the turnover 
rate fares better in LDCs can be interpreted as a corroboration of this insight. It would imply that 
in OECD countries, de jure CBI is approximately equivalent to de facto CBI, whereas the two 
systematically deviate in LDCs. The main focus of our analysis will therefore be on de facto 
indicators. We distinguish between two transmission mechanisms through which a factually 
independent judiciary could be conducive to low inflation: a direct one and an indirect one. The 
indirect one is based on the assumption that a high degree of de facto JI leads to a high degree of 
de facto CBI (assuming a high level of de jure CBI), which, in turn, leads to low levels of 
inflation. The direct one is based on the insight that high levels of de facto JI lead to more 
output. The indirect transmission channel is presented first. 
The likelihood that factual CBI will remain low although CBI is formally high is (an inverse) 
function of the government’s capacity to credibly commit to its promises. The relevant promise 
refers to a monetary policy which is carried out independently from the (short-term) interests of 
the government by a central bank. The government’s capacity to credibly commit to its promises 
crucially depends on the factual independence that the judiciary enjoys. Ex post, the judiciary 
can be interpreted as an attempt of coming to terms with the commitment problem of the state. 
The laws passed by the legislature will be more credible if it is another branch that decides on 
their interpretation and enforcement. The hypothesis that a high degree of de facto JI is   6
conducive to a high degree of de facto CBI is based on the assumption that a high degree of de 
facto JI can also be interpreted as a proxy for a high probability that government will remain 
within the constraints spelled out in legal documents, the constitution included. Only if the 
judiciary is factually independent from government interference can economic agents trust that 
formally passed laws will factually be implemented. A general expectation that formally passed 
laws will factually be implemented includes, of course, the expectation that a formally 
independent CBI will also turn out to be factually independent. The argument does not 
necessarily imply that the governing board of a central bank has the competence to take a 
government to court if it believes the government to renege on the rules concerning the bank’s 
independence.1 
Yet, some courts play exactly that role. Art. 14,2 of the Statute of the European System of 
Central Banks, e.g., gives governors of national central banks who are fired by their 
governments before the end of their term the possibility to take their case to the European Court 
of Justice. If the Court is assumed to be factually independent, getting rid of governors who 
pursue policies not in the (short-term) interest of their respective governments will thus be 
difficult. This, in turn, increases de facto CBI. 
But the opposite also holds: a judiciary that is factually dependent on government can prevent a 
central bank from becoming factually independent. The Constitutional Court of Colombia, e.g., 
interpreted the constitutional “right to a worthy house” (art. 51) as implying that the state must 
provide house subsidies for the entire population and further specified that the Central Bank 
should establish a permanent real interest-rate ceiling on housing loans (Clavijo 2000). This can 
                                                 
1   Keefer and Stasavage (2003) put forward an alternative institutional channel that leads to higher de facto 
CBI. They argue that the introduction of a formally independent central bank will be more credible if it takes 
place in a system with a high number of veto players. The presence of multiple veto players with different 
preferences makes government policies more difficult to change and thus more credible. Hence, a high 
number of veto players would make the degree of de jure CBI a reliable proxy for de facto CBI.   7
be interpreted as an example for how a rather dependent judiciary (the value for de facto JI in 
Colombia is below the sample average for all countries) can interfere into the policy competence 
of a central bank and thereby prevent it from becoming factually independent. 
Another example from Latin America shows that the mere threat of the executive to go to (a 
dependent) court if the central bank does not implement the government’s preferred policy 
might be sufficient to make the central bank give in. The factual independence of the Supreme 
Court of Venezuela is clearly below the mean, it ranked 61
st out of 86 countries in 2000. 
Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez wanted the Bank to cut interest rates, Bank governor 
Domingo Maza Zavala responded saying that the Bank would not accept pressure from anyone. 
Chavez, in turn, announced that he would go to the Supreme Court, and the Bank did indeed cut 
rates (Central Banking, 2003). 
In Argentina, a number of former central bank governors have been tried in court for decisions 
they made while in office. “Putting former governors on trial is an old tradition in Argentina” 
(Central Banking, 2002). The Argentine judiciary ranks 67
th out of 86 with regard to factual 
independence. If governors anticipate that they might be tried later on for decisions not in tune 
with government interests, they will be more likely to make decisions that please governments. 
This is just another connection between a factually dependent judiciary and a factually 
dependent central bank. 
Our hypothesis that de facto CBI is, at least partially, determined by the degree of factual 
judicial independence might be criticized by pointing towards a potential endogeneity problem. 
Even though both variables are determined through the political process, there are good 
arguments in favour of judicial independence determining CBI – and not vice versa. The 
independence of the judiciary is usually guaranteed in the constitution, whereas the 
independence of the central bank is typically only secured via ordinary law. Constitutions are 
not only the more fundamental documents; they are also passed before other laws are.   8
Let us now turn to the non-CBI related transmission mechanism, i.e. to the hypothesis that a 
high degree of de facto JI does not work via a high degree of de facto CBI, but rather influences 
the inflation rate directly. This argument can be demonstrated within the framework of two 
simple but widely used models. Our first direct argument linking inflation and the legal system 
starts from the assumption that an independent and trustworthy legal system reduces transaction 
costs in the economy, as contracts can be more easily enforced and risk premia will be lower. 
Trust can be interpreted as another way to solve the time-consistency problem mentioned above. 
If general legal trust is high, private agents will not expect a government to renege on its 
promises by, for example, initiating a burst of unanticipated inflation for achieving short-term 
economic objectives. If the probability of surprise inflation is low, wage contracts need not 
contain a premium, leading to higher degrees of price stability. In addition, the danger that 
supply shocks cause sustained second-round effects through a wage-price spiral can be avoided. 
Again, private agents do not expect the government to additionally boost prices through lose 
monetary policy. This line of reasoning can be illustrated using the seminal model by Barro and 
Gordon (1983), which has been primarily used to illustrate the consequences of time-
inconsistency within the framework of monetary policy setting, the indirect channel from the 
legal system via CBI to inflation sketched above. In its simplest form the model consists of the 
following two equations:  
Phillips-curve:   ,  ) π α(π u u
e n − − =
CB loss function:  L(u, π) = u + γ π
2,  
where:  π   =  inflation rate, 
  π
e   =  rationally expected inflation rate, 
  u   =  unemployment rate, 
 u
n   =  natural unemployment rate, 
  γ =  relative weight of inflation in central bank loss function,  
  α =  inflation-unemployment trade-off parameter.   9
The conventional argument related to CBI focuses upon the size of the expected inflation rate in 
conjunction with γ. It is argued that a higher degree of credible inflation aversion reduces the 
time-inconsistency problem induced by the incentive of the central bank to surprise the private 
agents. This can be achieved by placing a high and credible weight upon the price stability 
objective, i.e. γ should be high. It is here where, for instance, Keefer and Stasavage (2003) bring 
in their hypothesis of a high number of veto players. Here we would like to stress a different 
relationship. First, we assume that a more independent or trustworthy legal system reduces 
transaction costs. Second, lower transaction costs cause overall economic efficiency to improve, 
which again will cause a fall in the natural unemployment rate. This direct effect of the legal 
system on the inflation rate is due to the specification of the Phillips-curve, which implies that 
following a reduction in the natural rate of unemployment inflation will also be lower in the 
rational expectations long-run equilibrium.  
A second framework that helps to illustrate the direct channel from the legal system to inflation 
is the Svensson model (1997), which describes an economy using three equations.  
Aggregate supply curve:   1 t t 1 t 1 t ε y α π π + + + + = , 
Aggregate demand curve:  1 t t | 1 t t 2 t 1 1 t η ) π (i β y β y + + + + − − = , 
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where:  πt   =  inflation in period t, 
 y t   =  output gap (yt – y*) in period t, 
 y *   =  potential output,  
 i t   =  nominal interest rate, 
   =  expectation of   in period t,   t | 1 t π + 1 t π +
     =  central bank’s inflation target, 
* π
  λ    =  relative weight on output stabilization.   10
Aggregate supply is characterized by a Phillips-curve, which describes the change of inflation as 
dependent upon the lagged output gap. Lagged income and real interest rates determine 
aggregate demand. The central bank minimizes its loss function by optimally adjusting its 
monetary policy instrument, the short-term nominal interest rate.  
Now the argument linking inflation and de facto JI starts from a related but slightly different 
angle, namely the relationship between real growth and potential output. As demonstrated by 
Feld and Voigt (2003), higher de facto JI facilitates real GDP growth. Since this is not a 
business cycle phenomenon but a long-term trend, it will affect potential output positively. The 
output gap in the aggregate supply curve becomes negative. In the next period, this effect will 
start generating downward pressure on the inflation rate. Since the inflation rate is persistent, 
there will be a gradual dynamic adjustment towards a lower inflation rate. At the same time, the 
central bank will begin to reduce interest rates to exploit the gain in terms of lower inflation for 
more output. The resulting increase in actual output will start narrowing the output gap until it is 
zero in equilibrium. While the equilibrium inflation rate is the same before and after the positive 
shock in potential output, the average inflation rate computed over the relevant adjustment 
period will be lower in the situation after the shock. Note that this channel works for different 
combinations of central bank preferences and economic structures. Both economic structure and 
preferences will influence the dynamic path of prices and thereby the average inflation rate over 
the transitional period. For instance, a high value for λ leads to a gradual adjustment of inflation 
to its long-run target, as the central bank tries to avoid large negative output fluctuations. Since 
we do not know the structural and preference parameters in practice, it is difficult to make 
precise quantitative predictions. However, at least qualitatively, higher de facto JI will lead to 
lower average inflation rates independently of any time-inconsistency considerations.  
To summarize, we have developed two theoretical hypotheses that link inflation and legal 
system both in a situation of a long-run equilibrium as well as a business cycle adjustment   11
situation. We call this a direct effect of the legal system on inflation, as it does not involve the 
intermediary stage of CBI, which lies at the heart of the previous hypotheses discussed in the 
literature. Hence, we would expect that a higher degree of judicial independence or confidence 
in the legal system should lead to lower inflation over and above their effect on the credibility of 
monetary policy through CBI.  
3 Estimation Approach and Data Description 
So far, two main hypotheses have been developed: firstly that de facto JI should be a good 
predictor for de facto CBI and secondly that indicators signalling a high degree of factual JI or a 
high degree of confidence of the population in the legal system should affect the inflation rate 
directly. In order to test the first hypothesis, some proxy for factual CBI is needed. Most 
previous studies have relied on the turnover rate of central bank governors (defined as “the 
actual average term of office of CB governors”) which has been suggested by Cukierman (1992, 
383) or a modified concept, namely the political vulnerability of central bank governors which 
indicates the probability that central bank governors will be removed from their offices during 
the six months following a change in government (introduced by Cukierman and Webb 1995). 
De facto CBI has thus been operationalized by the turnover rate (TOR) of central bank 
governors as measured by Cukierman and Webb (1995). The higher the turnover rate, the more 
dependent is the central bank governor perceived to be. This is, of course, a very crude proxy for 
the factual independence of a central bank. The government might have other means to 
influence monetary policy than by exchanging the central bank governor. The expulsion of a 
central bank governor can even be interpreted as the governor having resisted government 
influence because otherwise the government might not have resorted to such a drastic means as 
firing the governor. Indeed, it could even be argued that central bank governors who always act 
according to the wishes of government have a very low probability of ever losing their job.   12
Interpreted like this, low turnover rates could even stand for low independence! However, due to 
the lack of better proxies, we rely on the TOR here too as a proxy for de facto CBI. 2 
We employ three indicators for the influence of the legal system. First, an indicator for de facto 
JI which is described in more detail in Hayo and Voigt (2003).3 For simplicity reasons, this 
indicator measures the independence of the highest court of a country only, no matter whether it 
is a supreme court or a constitutional court. In many states, the judiciary is made up of 
thousands of decision-makers and, therefore, radical simplification is necessary. The focus on 
the highest court seems warranted because even though judges are personally independent, the 
ultimate control of court decisions lies with the highest courts, as they review – on the initiative 
of the parties involved – the lower court decisions. The independence of the highest court thus 
seems crucial. 
Secondly, this indicator is constructed as an objective - as opposed to subjective - indicator. A 
subjective indicator of de facto JI would ask for the perception of independence amongst those 
being polled. For those who live under the respective rules, their perception is surely an 
important element determining their behaviour. However, the norms of what an ideally 
independent judiciary would look like will most likely be different in different parts of the 
                                                 
2   The limitations of the turnover rate of central bank governors as a rather crude proxy for de facto CBI could 
be addressed by developing a better indicator. It seems, e.g., reasonable not to constrain attention to the 
central bank governor but to take the average term lengths of all board members into account. A government 
can also influence monetary policy by changing the number of board members: increasing their number 
could give the government the possibility to bring in bankers whose preferences are more in line with its 
own. Decreasing the number could give government the possibility to get rid of those central bankers whose 
preferences are least in line with government preferences. Any change in the number can be interpreted as 
increasing uncertainty and thus possibly having some effect on de facto CBI. Factual independence might 
also depend on being paid adequately and, moreover, on the budget of the bank because that can be an 
important determinant of the quality of its research department, the technical equipment and the like. A 
broader indicator would, of course, not only enable us to increase our knowledge concerning the interplay 
between the legal and the monetary system but also to be more precise concerning the impact of de facto 
CBI on inflation in general. 
3   The Appendix contains more information on how the indicator was constructed.    13
world. Data obtained by polls are thus not easily comparable and the de facto JI indicator is 
therefore based on factual information. In principle, anybody measuring de facto JI in the 
countries covered should end up with exactly the same data (see the Appendix for a more 
detailed description of the de facto JI indicator). The resulting indicator for de facto JI lies 
between 0 and 1 and is available for 86 countries. 
In the theoretical section, it was argued that the confidence of the population in the legal system 
might be an alternative to the de facto JI indicator. While the previous indicator is based on an 
objective assessment, this is clearly a subjective measure of the trustworthiness of the legal 
system by those who are exposed to it. We thus re-estimate equations 1-4 using this subjective 
indicator. This variable is based on three waves of the World Values Survey (1981, 1990, and 
1995-97). About 1000 randomly selected people in about 50 different countries and regions 
were asked a multitude of questions concerning values and attitudes (see World Values Study 
Group 2000). The actual question used here is worded as follows: “Please look at this card and 
tell me, for each item listed (here: The legal system), how much confidence you have in them, is 
it a great deal, quite a lot, not very much or none at all?” 
Comparing the de facto JI indicator and legal trust, we find that they are positively correlated 
with a coefficient of 0.18, which is not particularly high. Therefore, we also compute the 
common variation of these objective and subjective indicators. We apply principle components 
analysis to derive the underlying factor. The resulting factor explains almost 60% of the 
common variance, and the loadings of both variables on the factor are sufficiently high with 
about 0.77. We then use the component scores to construct a series representing a new indicator 
variable named legal factor.  
We interpret this factor as the degree of functionality of the legal system in a country. The two 
underlying variables are quite different, as is apparent from their relatively low correlation 
coefficient. First, the de facto JI indicator is based on objective elements, while the legal trust   14
variable consists of a subjective assessment of confidence in the legal system. Second, none of 
the variables directly captures the notion of a well-functioning legal system. Thus, these 
indicators contain a lot of noise for our question of interest. Constructing the legal factor allows 
to concentrate on the common variance that, at least in our view, reflects the de facto working of 
the legal system.  
Thus, we have three legal indicators for analysing the impact of the legal system on de facto 
CBI and actual inflation. The de facto JI indicator is constructed as an objective indicator of 
judicial independence, the second indicator is based on the subjective confidence of the 
population in the legal system, and the third indicator is based on the common variance of the 
first two. Reflecting the arguments above, we consider the legal factor to be the most interesting 
of these indicators from both, a theoretical and empirical point of view. 
We propose to test the indirect channel between inflation and the legal system by estimating the 
following regression for the turnover rate (TOR) of the countries i in the sample (i = 1,..N): 
(1) TORi = β0 + β1 Legal Indicatori + β2 CEOi + ε1i,  
CEO is a control variable that captures the formal term of office, in particular the legal 
protection of the tenure of the central bank governor. An effective legal protection for the 
central bank governor implies a negative coefficient. Regarding the legal system indicator, our 
theory also predicts a negative sign.  
As argued above, de facto CBI might be determined by the degree of checks and balances as 
well as by the degree of de facto JI. Keefer and Stasavage (2003) propose a model that shows 
the importance of veto powers, measured by the logarithm of institutional checks, on the 
turnover rate. This measure for checks and balances (LnCHECKS) was developed by Keefer 
(2002) and does not only recognize the number of veto players but also takes the electoral rules 
into account as they affect the cohesiveness of governing coalitions. A high value indicates the   15
existence of many independent branches of government with veto power over policy change. 
Thus, the next model also includes the formal term of office of the CEO and the interaction term 
of their checks variable with the term length of the CEO. 
(2) TORi = β0 + β1 Legal Indicatori + β2 CEOi + β3 LnChecksi + β4 (LnChecks*CEO)i + ε2i 
Regarding the test of the direct channel of the legal system on inflation, we estimate the 
following equation for the logarithm of the average inflation rate over the period 1980 to 1998: 
(3) LnInflationi = β0 + β1 Legal Indicatori + β2 de jure CBIi + β3 OPENi + ε3i 
We add two control variables; the indicator of de jure CBI, which goes back to Cukierman et al. 
(1992) and the degree of openness (OPEN).4 Romer (1993) argues that policy makers have 
fewer incentives to inflate ex post as imports increase as a share of total consumption.5 A larger 
share of the variation in inflation rates may be explained if the veto hypothesis based on checks 
and balances put forward by Keefer and Stasavage (2003) is interpreted as complementary to 
our approach. The authors use two different indicators for checks and balances: the LnChecks 
indicator presented above and the political constraints indicator (POLCON) developed by 
Henisz (2000), which takes into consideration the number of formal constitutional veto points 
present in a political system, the issue whether the veto points are controlled by representatives 
of different parties, and the cohesiveness of the majority that controls each veto point. Since the 
former turns out to be insignificant, they include the latter in their model. To provide a tough 
testing ground for our legal indicators, we also choose POLCON. Thus, it seems promising to 
include the indicators for veto powers within the executive and the legislative into the model and 
to test for an additional and direct influence of the judicial system on the inflation rate.  
                                                 
4   Forder (1996) and (1998) criticises the existing de jure CBI measures based on conceptual and data-based 
arguments.  
5   Openness is defined as imports of goods and services divided by GDP over the period 1980 to 1999. The 
data are from the IMF International Financial Statistics.    16
(4) Ln  Inflationi = β0 + β1 Legal Indicatori + β2 de jure CBIi + β3 OPENi + β4 POLCONi  
 +  β5 (POLCON*CBI)i + ε4i 
There may be doubts that we truly measure the impact of the legal system using our indicators. 
For instance, it is possible that both the degree of inflation and judicial independence are 
determined by yet another factor. Since it is not clear what this other factor may be, it appears to 
be sensible to investigate the robustness of our results by including rather broad indicators of 
institutional quality. First, there is the consequentionalist argument that those countries with 
higher incomes must have, ceteris paribus, better institutions. Second, geographic circumstances 
might have been beneficial to institution building. Reflecting these considerations, we employ 
the logarithm of real income in US dollars and the latitude as control variables.  
Finally, we test for the influence of the direct and the indirect channel of the legal system on 
inflation by including the turnover rate in the equation for the inflation rate (see model 5) in a 
system of equations that allows for cross-equation correlations of the disturbances.  
(5a) TORi = β0 + β1 CEOi + β2 Legal Indicatori + β3 LnChecksi + β4 (LnChecks*CEO)i + ε5ai, 
(5b) Ln  Inflationi = β5 + β6 de facto JIi + β7 de jure CBIi + β8 OPENi + β9 POLCONi +  
  β10 (POLCON*CBI)i + β11 TORi + ε5bi, 
 with  cov(ε5a ε5b) = σ
2 ≠ 0.  
If, on the one hand, we only found the indirect channel to be significant, it would be clear that 
identified direct effects in models 3 and 4 would be spurious. If, on the other hand, both direct 
and indirect effects turned out to be significant, then this would be evidence that both 
transmission channels of the legal system on inflation are present in the data.    17
4 Estimation Results: Indirect Channel of Transmission 
In the empirical analysis, the sample size varies depending on the included variables. At a 
minimum we have 34 countries, more than one third of which are not members of the OECD. 
The maximum sample sizes are 46 in the turnover rate models and 51 in the inflation rate 
models, with about one half of the countries being OECD members. Before interpreting the 
estimates, it is useful to check the statistical properties of the estimated equations. Here we make 
use of several diagnostics: Tests for heteroscedasticity based on White (1980) using squares of 
regressors and squares of regressors plus cross-products, respectively. A normality test as 
suggested by Jarque and Bera (1987) with a small-sample correction. A RESET test for 
misspecification is based on Ramsey (1969). Within-sample instability tests developed by 
Hansen (1992). 
We commence the empirical analysis by investigating the existence of the indirect effect of the 
legal system via strengthening de facto CBI. Models (1a) to (1c) in Table 1 analyse the effect of 
the legal system indicators on the central bank governor turnover rate, with the legal protection 
of the tenure of the central bank governor as a control variable. The diagnostic tests for Model 
(1a) in Table 2 reveal evidence of non-normality in the residuals. To study how this excessive 
non-normality affects the results, we re-estimate the equation with two dummy variables to 
compensate for outliers (Brazil and Uganda). It turns out that the outcomes are quite similar 
(results available upon request), with the marginal significance levels of the variables of interest 
being somewhat lower. We find that de facto JI has a significantly negative influence on the 
turnover rate. The legal protection of the central bank governor, on the other hand, does not 
show up as significant in this model. Model (1b) estimates the same regression with legal trust 
instead of de facto JI and the qualitative results are similar. Finally, employing the legal factor in 
model (1c), we get stronger results, as this legal system indicator is significant at the 1% level.   18
Note that models (1a) to (1c) suffer to some degree from insample instability, which may 
indicate some misspecification.  
In model (2a), we add the veto power indicator (LnChecks) put forward by Keefer and 
Stasavage (2003) and its interaction with CEO, the formal term of office for the central bank 
governor. Table 2 shows that model (2a) suffers from non-normality. As before, re-estimation of 
the model with additional dummy variables for Brazil and Uganda does not affect results in a 
noteworthy way. While both, veto power interaction and the de facto JI indicator show a 
negative sign, none of the variables are significant at a 10% level. However, this is partially due 
to a high degree of collinearity among the included variables as well as with the constant term.  
The legal system indicator becomes significantly negative at a 5% level when including the 
legal trust variable as shown by the estimates of model (2b). None of the other variables are 
significant. Note that the RESET test indicates some misspecification. Finally, we use the legal 
factor in model (2c). This time our variable of interest is significant at a 1% level, while the 
other variables remain insignificant.  
To allow for a relationship between LnChecks and the legal system indicators, we also augment 
the above regression by interacting these two variables. It turns out, however, that the interaction 
is not significant (results omitted). To summarise, we find that the legal system has a direct 
influence on the turnover rate over and above the legal protection of the tenure of the central 
bank governor and institutional veto power. We interpret this as evidence for the indirect 
channel of transmission outlined above. The coefficient of determination of these regressions is 
not particularly high. This may be due to the fact that the turnover rate is a very noisy indicator 
of de facto CBI.  
 
 Table 1: Explaining the turnover rate 
Model              (1a) (1b) (1c) (2a) (2b) (2c)












de facto JI  -0.40(*) 
(0.22) 
        -0.28
(0.23) 
Legal Trust    -0.271(*) 
(0.140) 
     -0.348*
(0.128) 
 
Legal Factor      -0.161** 
(0.056) 
     -0.151**
(0.053) 
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Table 2: Diagnostic information on models in Table 1 
Model              (1a) (1b) (1c) (2a) (2b) (2c)
No.  of  observations 46            34 34 46 34 34
SE              0.339 0.318 0.300 0.328 0.285 0.282
R
2              0.07 0.12 0.22 0.17 0.34 0.34
F-test  F(2,43) = 1.66  F(2,31) = 2.02  F(2,31) = 4.30*  F(4,41) = 2.15(*) F(4,29) = 3.65*  F(4,29) = 3.86* 
Normality test  Chi
2(2) = 9.67**  Chi
2(2) = 4.81  Chi
2(2) = 5.30  Chi
2(2) = 7.46*  Chi
2(2) = 3.79  Chi
2(2) = 3.72 
Heteroscedast. test  F(4,38) = 1.73  F(4,26) = 1.19  F(4,26) = 1.93  F(8,32) = 1.78  F(8,20) = 0.40  F(8,20) = 0.55 
Heteroscedast. test 
with cross-products
F(5,37) = 1.93  F(5,25) = 0.91  F(5,25) = 1.54  F(13,27) = 1.08  F(13,15) = 0.39  F(13,15) = 0.51 
RESET  F(1,42) = 1.35  F(1,30) = 0.01  F(1,30) = 1.37  F(1,40) = 0.46  F(1,28) = 5.54*  F(1,28) = 6.76* 
Instability  variance              0.707* 0.523* 0.181 0.503* 0.093 0.054
Instability joint  1.33*  0.939  1.49*  1.41  1.26  1.51 
Notes: The symbols (*), *, ** indicate significance at a 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level.  
 5 Estimation Results: Direct Channel of Transmission 
Table 3 summarizes the result related to the analysis of the direct influence of the legal system 
on the inflation rate averaged over the period 1980 to 1998.6 Model (3a) regresses the de facto JI 
indicator, degree of openness, and de jure CBI on the logarithm of the inflation rate. First, the 
diagnostic tests of model (3a) are fine except for deviations from the normality assumption (see 
Table 4). When including dummy variables for Bolivia, Brazil, and Nicaragua in model (3a), the 
normality test no longer rejects. The impact of including these dummy variables on the results 
for the other variables is negligible. We find that the de facto JI indicator has a significantly 
negative impact on the inflation rate at a 1% level. In addition, openness has a significantly 
negative effect on inflation as shown earlier by Romer (1993). Note that the de jure CBI 
variable does neither display the theoretically expected sign nor is it statistically significant.7  
Model (3b) uses the confidence in the legal system as an indicator for the legal system. As can 
be seen from Table 4, there appears to be heteroscedasticity in the residuals. To account for that, 
we employ robust standard errors based on White (1980) for inference purposes. In general, 
results are very similar to the ones found for model (3a), except for a higher marginal 
significance level of the legal system indicator. Finally, model (3c) replaces legal trust with the 
legal factor. Not only is the legal factor significant at a 1% level, its inclusion has a dramatic 
effect on the explanatory power, which rises from 0.33 to 0.52. Note, however, that for both 
models (3b) and (3c) there is evidence of misspecification as indicated by the RESET-test.  
                                                 
6   We also estimated the effect of interacting legal trust and CBI. This variable is highly collinear to legal trust 
and slightly less significant.  
7   Freytag (2001) argues that a form of CBI that has not been taken into account by the Cukierman index is 
fixing the exchange rate. He proposes an indicator that takes into account any external commitments a 
central bank may have entered into. The correlation between his alternative index for de jure CBI and the 
Cukierman index is relatively small (0.15). However, re-estimating the models with this indicator does not 
change the results very much.    22
In Model (4a), we add a variable measuring the political constraints of a government (Polcon) 
and its interaction with de jure CBI. In Keefer and Stasavage (2003), this variable performed 
better with respect to explaining inflation than the LnChecks variable used in the turnover rate 
regression. It can be shown that this is also true for our sample (results omitted). The diagnostic 
statistics are fine and both the de facto JI indicator and openness are significantly negative at a 
10% level. Now we find that de jure CBI is significantly positive a t  a  5 %  l e v e l ,  t h u s  
contradicting the basic hypothesis of higher CBI leading to lower inflation. This reflects the 
result that the relationship between formal CBI and inflation breaks down in a sample that 
includes countries that are not members of the OECD.8  However, the interaction between 
political constraints and de jure CBI is significantly negative. Only when the checks and 
balances are sufficiently strong does CBI have a negative impact on the inflation rate, which 
supports Keefer and Stasavage’s argument. For instance, if both CBI and LnChecks take on 
their mean values, the net effect of CBI on inflation will be positive. POLCON on its own is 
significantly positive at the 10% level, which is not in accordance with their hypothesis. 
                                                 
8   See Sturm and de Haan (2001) for a discussion of this issue using an extended and edited data base. Table 3: Explaining the average inflation rate in logs  
Model              (3a) (3b) (3c) (4a) (4b) (4c)












de facto JI  -2.96** 
(0.81) 
        -1.92(*)
(0.99) 
Legal trust    -1.27(*) 
(0.70) 
     -1.37**
(0.48) 
 
Legal Factor      -0.94** 
(0.21) 
     -0.78**
(0.19) 






























(POLCON * de 
jure CBI) 






Notes: The symbols (*), *, ** indicate significance at a 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level. Standard errors in model 3b are heteroscedasticity-
consistent (HCSE) based on White (1980).    24
Table 4: Diagnostic information on models in Table 3 
Model              (3a) (3b) (3c) (4a) (4b) (4c)
Exclusion tests of legal system indicators after including: 
Log Real GDP  F(1,47) = 3.41(*)  F(1,29) = 13.3**  F(1,29) = 21.3**  F(1,44) = 2.31  F(1,27) = 9.42**  F(1,27) = 17.3** 
Latitude  F(1,29) = 8.40**  F(1,29) =  5.12*  F(1,29) =  14.1**  F(1,27) =  6.70*  F(1,27) = 8.58**  F(1,27) =  14.4** 
No.  of  observations 51            34 34 51 34 34
SE              1.406 1.293 1.087 1.32 1.037 0.92
R
2              0.27 0.33 0.52 0.39 0.60 0.68
F-test  F(6,45) = 5.92**  F(3,30) = 4.86**  F(3,30) = 11.0**  F(5,45) = 5.74**  F(5,28) = 8.26**  F(5,28) = 11.8** 
Normality test  Chi
2(2) = 12.1**  Chi
2(2) = 0.63  Chi
2(2) = 1.89  Chi
2(2) = 5.52  Chi
2(2) = 8.30*  Chi
2(2) = 8.31* 
White test   F(9,40) = 0.50  F(6,23) = 4.89**  F(6,23) = 1.50  F(10,34) = 1.00  F(10,17) = 1.07  F(10,17) = 0.69 
White test with 
cross-products 
F(9,37) = 0.48  F(9,20) = 3.62**  F(9,20) = 1.06  F(19,25) = 1.30  N.A.  N.A. 
RESET  F(1,46) = 1.64  F(1,29) = 8.04**  F(1,29) = 6.84*  F(1,44) = 0.54  F(1,27) = 2.19  F(1,27) = 1.54 
Instability  variance              0.124 0.039 0.062 0.358 0.122 0.089
Instability joint  0.652  0.585          0.529 1.004 1.875 0.867
Notes: The symbols (*), *, ** indicate significance at a 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level. Standard errors in model 3b are heteroscedasticity-
consistent (HCSE) based on White (1980).  
 In model (4b) we use legal trust as the variable of interest and find evidence of non-normality in 
the residuals (see Table 4). Including a dummy variable for Brazil removes a large extent of this 
non-normality, while leaving the estimation results unaffected. Again, we find a significantly 
negative impact of our legal system indicator, this time at a 1% level. These results also carry 
over to a regression that replaces legal trust with our legal factor. Including the legal factor 
raises the fit of the equation again, from 0.60 to 0.68.  
So far, we have assumed that our three indicators measure what we are interested in, namely the 
impact of the legal system. As discussed in section 3, it may be the case that both inflation and 
the legal system are influenced by a third causal factor that we have not controlled for. Since it 
is unclear what this third factor might be, we use two broad indicators as control variables, 
namely the logarithm of GDP per capita and latitude. Table 4 provides exclusion tests for our 
three legal indicators in all models considered when either real income or latitude is included in 
the regressions. Only in model (4a) is the legal system indicator no longer significant at a 10% 
level when including real income per capita. Even in that case, the marginal significance level of 
the exclusion test is 0.14 in the case of the de facto JI indicator and 0.43 in case of real income. 
Thus, we do not find any evidence that our findings for the impact of the legal system on 
inflation are spurious. To summarize, inflation is lower when countries have a high degree of 
openness, de jure CBI and a relatively large number of political constraints, and an independent 
judiciary. Thus, we found evidence for a direct channel from the legal system to inflation. 
In the final step of our analysis, we combine models (2c) and (4c) by including the turnover rate 
in the equation for the inflation rate. We confine this analysis to the legal factor, as it is the 
theoretically most convincing and the variable with the highest explanatory power of our three 
indicators. This allows us to see whether both, direct and indirect transmission channel of the 
legal system are present. The estimation of equations (5a) and (5b) takes place in an efficient 
full-information maximum likelihood setting (FIML). Since the constant terms are not   26
significant but highly collinear to the institutional variables, they are removed (exclusion test 
does not reject: Chi
2(2) = 1.19). This does not affect the outcome for the legal factor much (its 
marginal significance falls from 0.01 to 0.011) but it makes the other institutional variables 
highly significant. Note that including real GDP per capita or latitude neither has a noteworthy 
effect on the outcome for the other regressors nor are these variables significant. Table 5 
presents the two-equation model estimated by FIML. After including a dummy variable for 
Brazil in the inflation equation to avoid significant deviations of the residuals from a normal 
distribution, neither the single equation tests nor the vector tests indicate any statistical 
problems. All of the variables in the turnover rate model (5a) are statistically significant. The 
result remains that the legal term of office of the central bank governor has only the desired 
effects on de facto CBI if the institutional setting of the government is characterised by a high 
degree of veto power. In contrast, a better working legal system has a significantly negative 
effect on the turnover rate.  
Model (5b) shows that all variables in model (4c) remain significant except openness. In 
particular, the legal factor is significantly negative at a 1% level. Thus, there is strong evidence 
for a separate direct channel of the legal system on inflation. At the same time, the equation 
includes the turnover rate, which is significant at a 10% level. The system set-up allows us to 
consistently test restrictions on the parameters. We find that the combined effect of the legal 
factor through the direct and indirect channel is -0.74, which, perhaps not surprisingly, is 
significantly different from zero at a 1% level (Chi
2(1) = 29.4). The second hypothesis of 
interest is whether the direct effect is significantly larger than the indirect transmission channel. 
In absolute terms, the direct effect is larger, with the difference being 0.29, but statistically, we 
cannot reject that this difference is equal to zero (Chi
2(1) = 0.95). 
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Table 5: FIML estimation of equations explaining the turnover rate and the inflation rate 
Equation (5a)    (5b) 















POLCON * CBI  -12.5** 
(2.23) 




   Turnover  Rate  1.51(*) 
(0.88) 
   Legal  Factor  -0.52** 
(0.17) 
log-likelihood = -33.27   
no. of observations = 34   
Vector normality test: Chi
2(4) = 5.85  
Vector heteroscedasticity test: F(51,27) = 0.49 
SE of equations  0.288    0.661 
Normality Chi
2(2) = 4.23    Chi
2(2) = 1.32 
Heteroscedasticity  F(17,11) = 0.97    F(17,11) = 0.42 
Notes: The symbols (*), *, ** indicate significance at a 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level. 
The equation for the inflation rate contains an impulse dummy for Brazil.  
 
We conclude, therefore, that there is evidence for both a direct influence as well as an indirect 
influence from the legal system to the inflation rate. We cannot exclude the possibility that the 
impact of the two transmission channels on the inflation rate is rather similar in importance.  
Finally, Graph 1 gives an impression of the fit of the two equation system.    28



















































































Note: The observations reflect the countries sorted in an alphabetical order (see the Appendix 
for a list of countries).   
 
It is apparent that we are more successful in explaining average inflation rates across countries 
than turnover rates. But even in the case of the turnover rate there are few serious 
mispredictions.  
6 Conclusion  
This paper analyses the relationship between de facto central bank independence, inflation, and 
the legal system. We argue that a more independent and better functioning legal system is an 
important determinant of both de facto CBI and inflation. The working of the legal system is   29
measured via three indicators, de facto judicial independence, legal trust, and a legal indicator 
based on these first two indicators. The first is an indicator based on Feld and Voigt (2003), the 
second is computed from the World Values Survey, and the third is a statistical factor based on 
the common variance of these two indicators. The influence of the legal system on the inflation 
rate works via two channels, an indirect and a direct one. The indirect channel works through 
the strengthening of de facto CBI in the case of an independent and trustworthy legal system. 
The direct channel suggests that higher judicial independence lowers transaction costs within the 
economy and thereby increases efficiency. Consequently, we would expect a fall in the natural 
rate of unemployment and an increase in potential output. Within simple but widely used models 
of monetary policy, we show that this will lead to a reduction of the equilibrium rate of inflation 
(Barro and Gordon 1983) and a fall of the average rate of inflation over the relevant time period 
(Svensson 1997).  
Putting our hypothesis to the test, we find that there is both empirical evidence of an indirect 
channel of the legal system affecting inflation via de facto CBI as well as for a direct channel. 
Evidence for the working of the indirect channel is demonstrated within a regression explaining 
de facto CBI as proxied by the central bank governor turnover rate. A higher degree of de facto 
JI or legal trust will decrease the turnover rate, controlling for the influence of the formal terms 
of office and the checks and balances working within the executive and legislative branches of 
government. The direct relationship between the legal system and inflation is investigated in a 
regression explaining the logarithm of the inflation rate. Controlling for the influence of 
openness, de jure CBI, political constraints, and political constraints interacted with de jure 
CBI, we show that our legal system indicators contain a substantial degree of additional 
explanatory power. In our sample, such a model can explain 68% of the variation in the 
logarithm of the average inflation rate. We also establish that the direct influence of the legal 
system on the inflation rate is present even if we control for the working of the indirect channel.   30
Thus, both channels appear to affect the change in prices as separate channels, although we find 
more robust evidence for the direct effect. Hence, in addition to traditional factors, such as 
central bank independence or openness, or alternative factors (surveyed in Hayo and Hefeker 
2002), such as interest group influences or public inflation aversion, the legal system appears to 
be yet another noteworthy determinant of the average inflation rate.  
This result has important policy implications. First, to achieve low long-run average inflation 
rates, it may not be enough to create formally independent central banks, as there is a large gap 
between de jure and de facto central bank independence especially in many LDCs. Second, a 
well-functioning legal system appears to be one pre-requisite for achieving a stable monetary 
environment. Only in a well-functioning legal system can we expect that the central bank 
becomes factually independent. Given the actual degree of de facto independence of many legal 
systems in Third World countries, this situation may be a long way off. Policy advise that 
concentrates on a narrow form of institution building such as creating central bank may turn out 
to be rather ineffective. The same holds true if such an institution building is part of conditional 
development assistance or international loan programmes. Thus, changes in the formal CB rules 
are likely to be much more successful if they are conditional on other reforms in these countries.  
Arguably, this advocates a different type of conditionality, namely to build fundamental social 
institutions first before tackling the task of creating more specialized economic institutions. In 
our analysis of the impact of the legal system, this would yield a double-dividend: a better 
working of central bank independence, what we called indirect channel, together with a better 
working of the economy as a whole, the direct channel in our framework. However, this makes 
the task of formulating reform proposals for Third World countries or conditions for 
development aid or loans much more difficult. Not only is it much more ambitious to reform 
the, say, legal system of a country, it also takes much more time. Time lags, however, are an   31
important obstacle to monitoring the fulfilment of the conditions and the principle-agent 
problems are exacerbated.    32
Appendix 
Sample 
The countries considered in the empirical analysis are: 
In Table 1:  
Indicators: Legal Trust and Legal Factor (34 countries):  
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Ghana, Hungary, Iceland, India, Italy, Japan, Korea (South), Mexico, 
Netherlands, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Turkey, UK, USA, Uruguay, Venezuela. 
Indicator: De facto JI (46 countries): In addition to the ones above: Botswana, Costa Rica, 
Egypt, Greece, Israel, Kenya, Malaysia, Nepal, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Uganda. 
 
In Table 3, Table 5, and Graph 1:  
Indicators: Legal Trust and Legal Factor (34 countries): see above 
Indicator: De facto JI (51 countries): In addition to the ones above: Bolivia, Botswana, Costa 
Rica, Egypt, Greece, Israel, Kenya, Malaysia, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, 
Panama, Singapore, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
 
   33
Some information on the construction of the de facto JI indicator 
The indicator for de facto JI is based on the following list of eight questions that were sent out to 
experts in the sampled countries (see Feld and Voigt 2003). The time period they had to evaluate 
is 1960-1999. The answers to these questions were coded in such a way that the resulting 
variables take on values between 0 and 1. The unweighted sum of the variables is then divided 
by the number of variables for which information is available.  
(1–3)  A crucial aspect of de facto JI will be the effective average term length of the members 
of the highest court.9 If the actual term length and the one to be expected on the basis of the 
legal foundations deviate, this is interpreted as a signal for a low level of factual independence. 
Removing a judge before the end of term is a serious breach of JI and countries where this has 
occurred get a low score. 
(4)  The influence of a judge depends on the number of other judges who are members of the 
same court. By increasing the number of judges, the weight of the sitting judges can be reduced. 
The de facto indicator counts how many times the number of judges has been changed since 
1960. 
(5–6)  In order to be factually independent, judges need to be paid adequately. It was therefore 
inquired whether the incomes of judges have at least remained constant in real terms since 1960. 
But the efficacy of courts does not only depend on the income level of their judges but also on 
the number of clerks employed, the size of the library, the availability of modern computer 
equipment etc. This aspect has been taken into account by asking for the development of the 
court’s budget as an organization (also since 1960). 
                                                 
9.   This variable is closely reminiscent of the turnover rate calculated for central bank governors and used as a 
proxy for their de facto independence. Henisz (2000) has calculated this variable for the tenure of supreme 
court judges for 45 countries for the period from 1960 to 1990.    34
 
(7)  Any change in the basis of the legal foundation of the highest court will increase 
uncertainty among its potential users, i.e. will be counter to one of the most fundamental 
functions of the law. Frequent changes of the respective legal rules are therefore interpreted as 
an indicator for low de facto independence. 
(8) The  de facto degree of judicial independence is low if decisions of the highest court, in 
order to be implemented, depend on some action of one (or both) of the other branches of 
government and this cooperation is not granted. The more frequently this has been the case, the 
less independent is JI supposed to be factually.    35
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